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Efficiency of French football clubs and its dynamics 
 
 
 
Abstract:    
 In the paper we evaluate the efficiency of French football clubs (Ligue 1) from 
2004 to 2007 using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with « Assurance Region ». Then, we 
study the dynamics of clubs’ performances.  
Contrary to previous works on other championships, best teams in competition or most 
profitable clubs are not the most efficient units in our sample. High average scores show that 
French First League is efficient. The first source of inefficiency in the Ligue 1 is linked to size 
problems and over-investments. Despite an average club performance stable over the period, 
we exhibit a deterioration of conditions in which clubs operate. 
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1/Introduction   
The French football First League called “Ligue 1” (L1) belongs to the “Big5” that is 
the English, Spanish, Italian, French and German football championships. Those major 
leagues are involved in a competitive contest for talent on the players market, a situation 
institutionalized since 1995 and the Bosman case. In addition, the best clubs of those 
championships are also directly in competition on the field during European cups. 
In that global picture, the L1 has two faces. On one hand, a healthy financial situation 
with its clubs relatively less put into debt than their European neighbors. As an illustration the 
L1 global turnover in 2008 was positive for the third consecutive year. The league works with 
an auditing organism, the “Direction National du Contrôle de Gestion” (DNCG) and 
professional French clubs are audited each season with the obligation to publish their financial 
accounts. This particular attention has allowed the league to avoid the European football 
financial crisis (Gouguet and Primault 2006), at least apparently (Andreff 2007). Moreover 
this control is one of the factors leading to a high level of competitive balance. The L1 is 
known indeed to be highly balanced
1
. On the other hand, European performances of French 
clubs are disappointing; especially in Champion’s League (the most prestigious European 
cup). The L1 is ranked 5
th
 in the 2009 UEFA ranking, based on national previous years 
performances in all European cups. Furthermore, only two clubs figure in the Deloitte & 
Touche 2008 “Football Money League”, the annual study on the top 20 European clubs with 
the highest revenue (6 of those clubs are English, 4 from Italy and Germany and 3 from 
Spain). 
Taking actively part in this European race, the L1 tries to reach a higher step in the 
international hierarchy while respecting a certain conception of financial fair play. But in 
order to obtain greater achievement, the L1 need to know more about itself. What can be said 
about French football clubs efficiency? A question never investigated while several works 
have already been performed on English, American, Spanish or Portuguese League. In that 
context, the aim of this paper is to highlight, first, whether French clubs are efficient or not. 
Then, where do the inefficiencies come from. Finally, how and why the clubs’ performance 
do evolve across time. 
Table 1 shows some references (from the older to the more recent one) dealing with 
efficiency of sportive organizations. Authors span a large scope of units from coaches to 
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federations or clubs. Most of these works have been performed on US or English data with a 
majority studying football. The method of evaluation is either mathematical (namely DEA), 
or statistical (Stochastic Frontier Analysis for instance). Both methodologies belong to the 
family of efficiency frontier method, which is the most relevant approach for this range of 
works. From this quick literature review we notice the lack of study about the French First 
League, despites that L1 is one of the biggest European championships. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 (all tables and figures are at the end of the document) 
 
Efficiency measurement in sport and particularly in football is challenging. If 
efficiency is a simple notion, defined by the ability of reaching objectives with respect to 
means, the difficulty lies in the identification of a football club objectives and means
2
.
 
Literature on club manager objectives can be split into two different classes of models. First 
works on sports economics assumed, as for enterprises, that club managers face a classical 
profit maximization problem. It is the case for example, of Neale in (1964) or Quirk and Fort 
in (1992), these works both studying American professional leagues. However in 1973, 
Sloane built a more European fashion model with club managers maximizing their own 
utility. He introduced a sportive dimension in the manager objectives, this manager being also 
a sportsman. In 1996, 1999 and 2006, Késenne develops in the same way, a model where 
victories are more important than profit for club managers. In Rasher (1997) or in Vrooman 
(2000), the authors propose a situation where profit and the number of victories are 
maximized at the same time. 
Despite empirical test attempts, neither the assumption of profit maximization nor the 
assumption of utility maximization has been undoubtedly validated; and both assumptions are 
traditionally used. Nevertheless, it seems that, in Europe, and especially at lower levels of 
competition, the assumption of utility maximization is the relevant one. Indeed, Szymanski 
and Smith (1997) or Kesenne (1999) for instance, argue that bad budgetary balances in a 
majority of clubs go against the profit maximization behavior. We follow this argument here, 
even if we have to notice a tendency to the “Americanization of European football” (Hoehn 
and Szymanski 1999 or Andreff and Staudohar 2000).  
5 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA, initially proposed by Charnes and al in 1978) 
perfectly matches the multi-outputs peculiarities of the problem. Indeed, using no assumption 
on the objective function of a club manager, we can deal with an efficiency evaluation 
considering at the same time both sportive and financial issues. The flexibility is one of the 
DEA quality and also a limit. Letting the method freely choose each objective weight in the 
maximization can lead to extreme cases (with only one of the two objectives considered). 
That is why, in order to fit the literature, we use the “Assurance Region” (AR) method. By 
doing so, we constrain the two dimensions to be considered (sportive and financial). The AR 
use is one of the extensions proposed in Barros and Leach (2006a). Then it is natural to use 
Malmquist indexes to obtain information on performance evolutions since we can easily 
compute those indexes from our previous DEA scores. 
Haas (2003b) and Barros and Leach (2006a), both on the English First League and 
Haas (2003a) on US soccer, are our three main references and we use them as a comparison 
for our results. We describe efficiency of French football and characterize its evolution using 
both financial and sportive dimensions. We find that more than one third of French clubs are 
on the best practice frontier with an average efficiency score of 0.93 (maximum is 1). The 
first inefficiency source is linked to a size problem, with a majority of clubs over-investing in 
players. In our sample there is no correlation between efficiency scores and athletic 
performances contrary to previous studies on English or American First League. We even find 
a negative correlation between efficiency and financial achievement. This “exception 
Française” is described in the results section. 
The dynamic study of managerial performance emphasizes two different ideas. First, 
the average efficiency is decreasing across time. Mainly not because of the clubs themselves, 
but because of the environment in which they operate. It is especially due to total wage 
inflation. Then, L1 can be split in three clusters, each one with its own dynamic of efficiency 
evolution. Thus, this article presents different interests. It is, indeed, the first DEA application 
to the French League. Furthermore, allowing both static and dynamic characterization of 
efficiency, this work stressed some French professional football peculiarities, giving a new 
tool for league governance. 
Section 2 explains our methodology. Section 3 presents and justifies the data chosen 
for this paper. Section 4 and 5 are respectively devoted to results and conclusions.  
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2/Methodology   
 Besides the methodological interest explained in introduction, the DEA exhibits some 
other convenient features. Indeed, DEA is a non parametric technique and allows to study 
cases with relatively few observations (with only 20 clubs per season in the league, a standard 
parametric approach is difficult to implement). In addition, DEA can easily deal with multi-
outputs problems, even if the items used are not valued on a traditional market (for instance 
the points at the end of the season). Finally, efficiency scores can be used in order to compute 
Malmquist Index. On the minus side, statistical noise cannot be separated from inefficiency in 
our scores and as for any non-parametric method, statistic inference is challenging.  
The DEA built weighted average ratio of outputs on inputs for each Decision Making 
Unit (DMU i.e. football club here). Weights are chosen by the method itself during the linear 
program solving. Those weights vectors are set in order to be the most favorable for the 
evaluated DMU. Using efficient DMUs in the sample to form an efficiency frontier, we 
measure other DMUs inefficiency as the distance to this frontier. Efficiency scores are 
bounded between 0 and 1 with 1 for a fully efficient club. 
We have to notice that DEA computes a relative efficiency, each clubs being evaluated 
in respect to the other DMUs in the sample. For that reason we can only use relatively 
homogenous DMUs like football clubs of the same championship and at a similar level of 
competition. All technical aspects of DEA construction and use are given in appendix A. So 
in that section, we only briefly describe the steps required to the envelopment design. First, 
considering football clubs as production processes implies considering DMUs as using inputs 
to produce outputs. In that context, we have to define how to measure achievement (outputs) 
and how to measure resources (inputs). Our choices are explained in the Data section. Then, 
the model orientation and return to scale assumption have to be settled. We use here an output 
oriented model, that is, we measure inefficiency by the potential output expansion for a given 
input level
3
. Constant and variable returns to scale assumptions are successively used, giving 
respectively global efficiency (GE) and pure technical efficiency (PTE) scores. Even if the 
variable return to scale assumption is the likeliest, joint computation allows scale efficiency 
scores computation (SE with the ratio of GE on PTE). Scale efficiency scores give more 
precise information on inefficiency sources. 
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 In order to avoid extreme cases, where only one of the two output dimensions would 
be present in the maximization (thus one of the weights in the weighted average of outputs 
equal to 0); we use the “Assurance region” method (introduced in Thompson and al 1986). 
By doing so, we constrain the two output dimensions weights ratio to be bounded between an 
upper and a lower bound
4
. It is equivalent to preventing one dimension from being over-
represented (or even the only dimension to be represented). As explained in the introduction, 
it is relevant in the European case to encompass both sportive and profit dimensions. A more 
formal explanation of the AR method is given in appendix A. 
The study last step is to compute and decompose the Malmquist indexes (as described 
in Färe and Grosskopf 1992). We can build those indexes using efficiency scores from the 
DEA first step (all the details are given in appendix B). Computation gives the overall 
performance evolution for each club, while decomposition splits that evolution into two 
components: an endogenous and an exogenous one. The interested reader can find more 
extensive explanations in Barros and Santos (2003). 
 
3/Data 
All the data are from the INSEE website (Institut National de la Statistique et des 
Etudes Economiques) for populations and from the French Professional League annual reports 
for financial and sportive data. Two inputs and two outputs are used to build the efficiency 
frontier for French professional clubs from 2004 to 2007. For the purpose of the study, we 
only focus on clubs playing in the First League during the whole period (14 clubs during 3 
seasons or 42 observations). Descriptive statistics of the data are given in appendix C.  
Our first input is the club total wage. It is a proxy for the team talent stock
5
 (as in 
Szymanski and Smith 1997). This measure is not perfect since it encompasses some non-
player salaries and is not a perfect measure of talent (wage is also a function of player 
popularity). It is, nevertheless, the most accurate measure we have. First, because we 
investigate the club’s global efficiency, bearing in mind that this club is a Decision Making 
Unit (DMU) as well as a sportive team, which implies that we also have to consider the talent 
of all people working with or around the team, even when they are not players (i.e. coach, 
staff); second, because player’s popularity can be considered as one of his qualities and so has 
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to be included in his skills (popularity attracts fans and allows for some merchandising and 
sponsoring). We use population size of the club city as the second input in our frontier. We, 
have to consider that clubs are localized in different areas. Those areas are characterized by 
different population sizes. Our clubs face, incidentally, different potential market sizes. 
Indeed, a bigger population means a relatively bigger fan-base, and thus a bigger gate receipt 
and a stronger merchandising. A bigger community is also a synonym for relatively bigger 
subsidies. The amount of population is, in our design, a non discretionary input (because the 
population is obviously not under the club manager control), a specification already used in 
Haas (2003b). 
Outputs (or objectives) include number of points at the end of the season and turnover. 
The number of points is a measure of the sport achievement for DMUs. It allows a ranking at 
the end of the season, with access to a European cup for the League top teams or relegation 
for the last three clubs. This output dimension has to be included in the clubs’ objectives, 
according to common sense and literature on owner objectives (Kesenne 1996, 1999 or 
Szymanski and Smith 1997). But we cannot consider professional clubs only in their athletic 
function. Part of the literature indeed, considers that football clubs are also profit maximizers 
(Rasher 97), or sometimes even only profit maximizers. Moreover, football clubs are moving 
closer
6
 to the private sector; a phenomenon emphasized by Andreff and Staudohar (2000). To 
encompass this, we use annual club turnovers to evaluate each club’s financial achievement 
(turnover includes gates receipts and TV rights both from national championship and 
European cups participations, merchandising, sponsoring and subsidies). Input and output 
choices are based on data availability or on previous literature; we use both criteria in this 
paper. 
To summarize we use 4 items
7
: 2 inputs (a discretionary one and a non-discretionary 
one) - total wage and urban area population - and 2 outputs – number of points and turnover.  
 
4/Results  
 
We organize our results in two parts. The first part answers questions about French 
club efficiency, inefficiency sources and type of efficient clubs. The second part gives details 
on the evolution of efficiency and the evolution reasons. 
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The L1 efficiency scores are reported in Table 2. Here we have each club’s average 
score for the overall period (from 04-05 to 06-07). A comprehensive table with each club 
score for each season is given in appendix D. In the second column, are the scores computed 
under the constant returns to scale assumption (measuring the global efficiency: GE). In the 
third column, are the scores computed under the variable returns to scale assumption 
(measuring the pure technical efficiency: PTE). Scale efficiency scores (SE, fourth column) 
are built with the two previous one since it is the ratio of scores under constant and variable 
returns to scale assumptions. All scores are bounded between 0 and 1 with 1 for a fully 
efficient club. 
Scale efficiency score shows whether the club size is optimal or not, while pure 
technical efficiency score gives information about the part of inefficiency coming from a bad 
managerial performance. That is, from an inefficient transformation process of inputs into 
outputs. By club size, we mean the total amount of resources involved in the activity. For 
instance, SOCHAUX is on the best practice frontier with all its scores equal to 1. The league 
average score for the entire period under consideration is high (0.93 and 0.85 for pure 
technical efficiency and scale efficiency). This average shows the good French clubs 
performance. Under the variable return to scale assumption (the more realistic one), more than 
one third of the clubs are indeed on the efficiency frontier. 
Scale inefficiency is the main reason for inefficiency in the French championship. 
SAINT-ETIENNE, AUXERRE and SOCHAUX are the only clubs to be fully efficient 
whatever the return to scale assumption. LYON and TOULOUSE are the only two clubs for 
which a non-optimal size is the only source of inefficiency. In that particular context, 
considering that populations are beyond managerial control, we are focusing on total wages 
for “size”. Therefore a non-optimal size is either an excessive or an insufficient total wage 
bill. All the other clubs are inefficient both because of their managerial practice and because 
of their non-optimal size.  
The fifth column of Table 2 gives the areas, on or under the frontier, to which a club 
belongs. Letter “c” means an optimal size of club (constant return to scale area), letter “i” a 
too small size (increasing return to scale area) and “d” an excessive size of club (decreasing 
return to scale area). We have three letters per club, one for each season in our sample. In 
more than half the cases (23/42), French clubs are too big in terms of inputs. In other words, a 
majority of them often overinvest in players at the beginning of the season. AUXERRE, 
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SAINT-ETIENNE and SOCHAUX have an optimal size for all the seasons while NICE is 
always too small. Several clubs alternatively over or under invest in players (TOULOUSE, 
RENNES, NANTES and MONACO). However, the reader must remember that a theoretical 
optimal club size is impossible to determine with DEA because the efficiency studied here is a 
relative one. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
From the last two columns of Table 2, we notice the difficulty to establish any link 
between efficiency level and athletic performance. It underscores the need of running some 
statistical tests to study a potential correlation. In order to perform these tests, we use the 
Mann-Whitney traditional procedure. First, we divide the sample into two subsamples using a 
different criterion for each comparison (Table 3). In the first comparison, for instance, we 
split our sample into two parts in respect to the median amount of points. Then we compare 
the average level of efficiency in each subsample. All the values of the Mann-Whitney Z 
statistics are positive (Table 3); meaning that for each comparison exposed in the first column, 
the second subsample is on average more efficient than the first one. It appears that sport 
achievement and efficiency are not correlated in the L1. In addition to this, financial 
performance (as well as population or total wage) and efficiency are negatively correlated.  
Interestingly and contrary to Barros and Leach’s (2006a) study of the English First 
League or Haas (2003a) on US soccer; we find here, that French sportive or financial 
“champions” are not the most efficient clubs in the L1. This result emphasizes, again, a 
general overinvestment with the biggest clubs winning too few matches and generating too 
little turnover in respect to the resources they engage. We think this major difference between 
the English and French championship is, at least partly, due to the higher level of competitive 
balance (CB) in France. More CB means a closer competition and so - ceteris paribus - fewer 
points for the champions (the corollary is less turnovers from TV rights, the sharing being 
partly function of the athletic performance). It is furthermore quite intuitive, that the two 
subgroups with the biggest populations or total wages have a less good efficiency score on 
average compare to their respective opponent. To sum up with a simple formula: “Small is 
beautiful” in the French championship. 
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INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Malmquist index computation for each DMU allows considering efficiency evolution 
from one season to the next (or for the overall period, i.e. 3 seasons). An index equal to 1 
means a perfectly stable performance across time. An index lower (greater) than 1 means that 
efficiency has decreased (increased). The League average indexes for both sub-periods (from 
04-05 to 05-06 and from 05-06 to 06-07) and for the entire period (from 04-05 to 06-07) are 
reported in Table 4. A table with each club’s performance evolution for each period is 
available in appendix D. On average, the L1 clubs are less efficient at the end of the period 
than at the beginning since the index on the entire period is equal to 0.76. It is also the case 
over our two sub-periods (respectively 0.87 and 0.90). The average league performance is 
decreasing across time. 
We can decompose the Malmquist index in order to distinguish two different sources 
of evolution. The first source is endogenous and due to the managerial change in the club 
activity. The second source is exogenous and due to all the factors out of the club manager’s 
control but impacting efficiency
8
; in other words, the environment in which the club operates. 
It is obvious from Table 4 that efficiency decrease is mainly due to deterioration of the 
environment (0.80), since the endogenous performance level is quite stable during the period 
(0.95) and even increasing for one sub-period. That result raises the question of the exogenous 
degradation reason.  
Considering the methodology we used to build the efficiency scores, an exogenous 
degradation of performance could only come from the way the different inputs/outputs 
evolved across the period. Recall that they are for each club: total wage, urban population, 
turnover and number of points. Population and number of points have been stable on average 
between 2004 and 2007, so these two items have not impacted the evolution of efficiency. In 
addition, the total L1 turnover became even bigger during this length of time. Consequently, 
all things being equal, efficiency should have been increasing over the period instead of 
decreasing. But during the same span of time, the total wage bill of French clubs has jumped 
with a global inflation of 47% in between 2004 and 2007. This inflation has overwhelmed the 
relative turnover improvement, leading to the deterioration of global performance
9
 in the 
League. A result also pointed out in Andreff (2007).  
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INSERT TABLE 4 
 
  However, those aggregate indexes hide different realities among clubs. We can in fact, 
distinguish 3 different groups of clubs. Each cluster has its own efficiency dynamics (Figure 
1). Cluster 1 (C1) is the closest to the average club of L1, with a stable level of management 
quality but a decreasing efficiency caused by an exogenous deterioration of the general 
performance (Total wage inflation). We find SAINT-ETIENNE, NICE, SOCHAUX, 
TOULOUSE and AUXERRE in C1. It is interesting to note that this cluster is composed by 
the five first clubs of the efficiency ranking (last column of Table 1). Cluster 2 (C2) is 
characterized at the same time by an environment degradation and an efficiency improvement. 
Thus, C2 overall performance is quite stable (RENNES, BORDEAUX, MARSEILLES, and 
NANTES). The 5 last clubs are finally in cluster 3 (C3) with both efficiency decrease and 
environment deterioration (PARIS, MONACO, LENS, LILLE and LYON). To summarize, 
even if all the French clubs have in common an exogenous environmental deterioration, they 
differ by their proper efficiency dynamics. There are three different dynamics of efficiency - 
one for each cluster - respectively stable, positive and negative. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
5/Concluding remarks 
 
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that such a study has been conducted 
on the French football championship (except for Jardin 2009 or Barros and Andreff 2009). 
This proves again the lack of analytical and economic studies on the French League despites it 
belongs to the “Big 5”. Nevertheless, a better understanding of the economical mechanisms 
involved in a club activity is a necessary condition to professional league governance 
improvement. In the current context of European race and in addition to the need for 
transparency required in Andreff (2007), an increasing performance of professional French 
football goes through this range of work. 
Furthermore, this paper presents a methodological interest since it is the first attempt 
to use the « Assurance Region » method combined with standard DEA in order to constrain 
weights total flexibility for the study of a professional football league (an extension suggested 
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at the end of Barros and Leach 2006a). By doing so, we are in line with the literature of 
European professional football, considering that both profit and victory maximization holds at 
the same time. Moreover, it is also the first time those efficiency scores have been used to 
build some Malmquist indexes for football clubs; allowing dynamic characterization of 
efficiency within a professional football League. We propose, using both the financial and 
sportive dimensions, a comprehensive framework to describe the efficiency of French football 
and characterize its evolution. We find that more than one third of our DMUs are on the best 
practice frontier with an average score in the French first league of 0.93 (maximum is 1). The 
first inefficiency source is linked to a size problem: clubs are too big in majority because of 
over-investments in players. A similar result has been shown for US soccer in Haas (2003a). 
In addition, the envelopment shows targets on the best practice frontier for inefficient clubs 
and gives recommendations for improvements of their efficiency.  
 Our work stresses some French League peculiarities. The absence of correlation 
between efficiency scores and sport achievements or the negative correlation between 
efficiency scores and financial results could seem to be awkward at first glance. Indeed, in 
previous studies (Barros and Leach 2006a or Haas 2003a), the best clubs, from financial or 
athletic point of view, are also the most efficient units. The main difference between French 
football and the other championships is about competitive balance level. It appears that 
French big clubs over-invest in terms of talent, because they win too few matches considering 
the resources they engage
10
. And because the sharing of TV rights is partly a function of the 
athletic performance, big clubs do not generate enough turnovers to be efficient (TV rights are 
the French clubs first revenue). This relative superiority of small clubs which is an “exception 
Française” comes directly from the League choice of financial governance. Besides, the 
dynamic study of managerial performance emphasizes two different ideas. First, the average 
efficiency is decreasing across time. Mainly not because of the clubs themselves but the 
environment in which they operate. It is especially due to total wage inflation. Then, L1 can 
be split into three clusters, each one with its own efficiency evolution dynamics. Those 
specificities have to be considered in order to design more accurate league policies. So, if the 
joint work of the League authorities and the DNCG seems to unable a financial control 
leading to a well balanced championship, it fails to prevent the wage inflation harming the 
French clubs, especially the biggest ones.  
14 
 
 We must keep in mind that efficiency, in our context, is relative. DEA never allows 
finding an optimal management or how to reach an absolute efficiency. But our results seem 
to be robust because they are not sensitive to our frontier design (orientation, items choices) 
except for the use of the “Assurance Region” which impacts upon efficiency ranking and 
lower mechanically efficiency scores on average. It is certain, however, that further works on 
a longer span of time will give some better ideas of efficiency dynamics in the French First 
League. Another direction for further research is the use of econometrical tools in order to 
explain efficiency differences among clubs. 
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Appendix A: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
DEA is directly in line with Farrell’s work (1957) but was more precisely developed 
by Charnes and al (1978). It is a mathematical method using a linear programming resolution 
to build an efficiency frontier from the sample observations. By the way, it measures 
efficiency of units in respect to that frontier. The first DEA model (CCR model) used constant 
returns to scale assumption. In 1984, Banker and al introduced the variable returns to scale 
assumption (BCC model). CCR and BCC models are the two basic models used in this paper. 
The « Assurance Region » (AR), developed by Thompson and al (1986) gives us a way to 
introduce a normative aspect in the score computations and so in the frontier construction. We 
also use the AR for the purpose of our study. All those models being well known, technical 
description of the next paragraphs is voluntarily simple. Interested readers can find some 
more detailed developments in Färe and al (1994), Charnes and al (1985) or Coelli and al 
(1998).   
The method maximizes, for each club and at each season, a virtual output on a virtual 
input ratio. A virtual output (resp. input) is a weighted average of all the output dimensions 
(resp. input dimensions) of each club. Weights are chosen by the method itself as a way of 
having the best unit score in respect to its competitor performances.  
More formally, we maximize 0E  
(for the club 0) under the constraints:  
1jE   (j= 0,…, n, all the clubs in the sample) for the units in the sample and with all 
the weights positive (u and v ≥ ε with ε an Archimedean constant)                                                                    
With 0E = 
000
000
......
......
2211
2211
ijijj
kjkjj
xvxvxv
yuyuyu
=
i
iji
k
kjk
xv
yu
0
0
, the efficiency of unit 0.       (1) 
y are the outputs and x the inputs. Full efficient unit efficiency is equal to 1 (by 
normalization) 
For this fractional system to be solved, we have to transform it into a linear one. A 
quite simple transformation since the more important in such a ratio is the relative magnitude 
in between numerator and denominator. Thus, we can choose a value for the denominator and 
rewrite: 
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The output oriented CCR and BCC model: 
 CCR from Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes uses the constant returns to scale assumption. 
While BCC from Banker, Charnes and Cooper uses a variable returns to scale assumption. 
In Charnes and al (1978) and Banker and al (1984) we have:  
CCR output oriented BCC output oriented 
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The only difference between the two models is the additional linear constraint in the 
BCC model, allowing variable returns to scale. 
The « Assurance Region » adjunction leads to a last linear constraint included in the 
system: 
 2,1212,1 UuuL , with L and U respectively the lower and upper bounds of the ratio 
of two outputs dimension (here 1 and 2) weights.            
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Appendix B: Malmquist Index definition and computation.  
 
Let 
Nt
N
tt Rxxx ),...,( 1 and
Mt
M
tt Ryyy ),...,( 1  be a producer inputs and outputs 
vectors in period t (t =1,…, T).  
The entire set of production is: TtyproducecanxyxP ttttt ,...,1):()(  
A functional technology representation for period t is given by the distance 
function (output oriented): 
 TtxPyyxD tttttt ,...,1))()/(:min(),(  
Which is a standard distance function defined for each producer. We can also define 
some adjacent distance functions as: 
))()/(:min(),( 1111 tttttt xPyyxD and
 ))()/(:min(),( 11 tttttt xPyyxD  
Standard distance functions are built in respect to the technology derived from 
observations on all the producers in that period. Adjacent distance functions are defined for 
each producer in the period in respect to the technology derived from observations on 
producers of an adjacent period. Two adjacent distance functions and two standard distance 
functions are required for the Malmquist index computation. (Färe and Grosskopf 1992) 
 Definition : The Malmquist productivity Index output oriented between periods t and 
t+1 is :  
 ),,,(
11 ttttt yxyxM
2
1
1
11111
),(
),(
*
),(
),(
ttt
ttt
ttt
ttt
yxD
yxD
yxD
yxD
 
It measures the productivity change between t and t+1. To do so, we use a geometrical 
mean of two indexes, one computed for period t and the other for t+1. The index is 
respectively higher, equal or lower than 1 if productivity has increased, stagnated, or 
decreased between t and t+1. 
Besides, this index can be decomposed in two factors. The first one is the technical 
efficiency change (the endogenous part of the performance evolution). The second one is a 
more general technical change (the exogenous part). 
 Decomposition : The Malmquist productivity index between t and t+1 can be 
decomposed as : 
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This factorization allows changes in productivity to be broken down into changes in 
efficiency and technological global change; with each component being less, equal or more 
than 1 according to its effect on total productivity change.   
 Computation: In a DEA framework and following Färe and al (1994) methodology, 
we can use some distance functions to build the index. Four different distance functions are 
required, and therefore four different linear program resolutions. Under the constant returns to 
scale assumption and with an output orientation we have : 
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Appendix C: Data  
Table a: Data descriptive statistics (number of observations: 42) 
 Total wage 
(in K€/year) 
Population  
(urban area in 1000) 
Number of 
points 
Turnover 
(in K€/year) 
Mean 27 866 1 543 605 55 55 877 
Maximum 93 469 11 174 743 84 140 553 
Minimum 9 609 85 080 34 21 234 
Stand- deviation 16 393.23 2 739 863.30 10.41 26 348.69 
 
Appendix D: Results 
Table b: Average efficiency scores by season 
Seasons GE PTE SE 
mean 04-05 0.8229 0.9229 0.8867 
mean 05-06 0.8240 0.9600 0.8537 
mean 06-07 0.7803 0.9335 0.8320 
Table c: Efficiency scores for each club at each season  
 Season 2004-2005 Season 2005-2006 Season 2006-2007 
 GE PTE SE GE PTE SE GE PTE SE 
    Auxerre 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
    Bordeaux 0.6745 0.7608 0.8865 0.7736 1.0000 0.7736 0.8776 1.0000 0.8776 
    Lens 0.8655 0.9460 0.9149 0.7014 0.9370 0.7486 0.6636 0.9880 0.6717 
    Lille 0.9590 1.0000 0.9590 0.9422 1.0000 0.9422 0.7561 0.8750 0.8641 
    Lyon 0.7997 1.0000 0.7997 0.6043 1.0000 0.6043 0.5066 1.0000 0.5066 
    Marseille 0.5771 0.7190 0.8026 0.8314 1.0000 0.8314 0.7317 1.0000 0.7317 
    Monaco 0.6901 1.0000 0.6901 0.4579 0.7410 0.6180 0.3892 0.7764 0.5014 
    Nantes 0.5678 0.7012 0.8098 0.8585 0.8858 0.9692 0.6239 0.6602 0.9450 
    Nice 0.9824 0.9835 0.9989 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9942 1.0000 0.9942 
    PSG 0.6835 0.8675 0.7878 0.7112 0.8983 0.7918 0.5849 0.7937 0.7369 
    Rennes 0.7205 0.9424 0.7645 0.8508 0.9786 0.8694 0.8514 0.9754 0.8729 
    St-Etienne 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
    Sochaux 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
    Toulouse 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8039 1.0000 0.8039 0.9454 1.0000 0.9454 
MEAN 0.8229 0.9229 0.8867 0.8240 0.9600 0.8537 0.7803 0.9335 0.8320 
Stand-dev 0.1619 0.1090 0.1048 0.1587 0.0720 0.1334 0.1963 0.1077 0.1693 
Minimum 0.5678 0.7012 0.6901 0.4579 0.7410 0.6043 0.3892 0.6602 0.5014 
Maximum 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
(Scores are computed using “DEAFrontier” software) 
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Table d: Malmquist index for each club and each period 
 On the overall period Between 04-05 and 05-06 Between 05-06 and  06-07 
Club 
Malmquist 
Index 
Efficiency Environment  
Malmquist 
Index 
Efficiency Environment 
Malmquist 
Index 
Efficiency Environment 
Auxerre 0.9808 1.0000 0.9808 1.0935 1.0000 1.0935 0.8993 1.0000 0.8993 
Bordeaux 1.1342 1.3010 0.8717 0.9976 1.1468 0.8699 1.0725 1.1345 0.9454 
Lens 0.6553 0.7667 0.8546 0.6761 0.8104 0.8342 1.0552 0.9461 1.1154 
Lille 0.5858 0.7884 0.7422 0.8444 0.9825 0.8594 0.8277 0.8025 1.0314 
Lyon 0.5880 0.6333 0.9284 0.6629 0.7556 0.8773 0.9170 0.8382 1.0939 
Marseille 1.1675 1.2676 0.9210 1.2552 1.4405 0.8713 0.9280 0.8800 1.0546 
Monaco 0.4542 0.5639 0.8054 0.5848 0.6634 0.8814 0.7436 0.8500 0.8748 
Nantes 0.9071 1.0985 0.8257 1.3216 1.5118 0.8742 0.7259 0.7266 0.9990 
Nice 0.6056 1.0120 0.5984 0.8635 1.0179 0.8483 0.7251 0.9942 0.7293 
PSG 0.7541 0.8555 0.8814 0.8697 1.0405 0.8358 0.8671 0.8222 1.0546 
Rennes 0.7816 1.1816 0.6614 0.8745 1.1808 0.7406 0.8687 1.0007 0.8680 
StEtienne 0.7594 1.0000 0.7594 0.7997 1.0000 0.7997 0.9897 1.0000 0.9897 
Sochaux 0.8093 1.0000 0.8093 0.7760 1.0000 0.7760 1.0359 1.0000 1.0359 
Toulouse 0.5960 0.9454 0.6304 0.6190 0.8038 0.7701 0.9504 1.1761 0.8081 
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Tables and figure to insert: 
Table 1: Literature review on efficiency of sportive organizations 
 
Papers Method Units Inputs Outputs Prices 
Jardin (2009) 
DEA-CCR Model 
and DEA-BCC 
model 
Soccer clubs in 
the  French 
First Division 
Total wages, home town 
population 
Points, Turnover  
Barros, Del Corral 
and Garcia-del-
Barrio (2009) 
Stochastic frontier 
latent class model 
Soccer clubs in 
the  Spanish 
First Division 
Operational cost Points Price of labor, price 
of capital 
Barros, Garcia-
del-Barrio (2009) 
Random 
stochastic frontier 
model 
Soccer clubs in 
the English 
Premier League 
Operational cost Sales, Points, 
attendance. 
Price of labor, price 
of capital-premises, 
price of capital-
investment 
Barros and 
Barrios (2008) 
Random 
stochastic model 
Soccer clubs in 
the English 
Premier League 
Operational cost Sales, Points, 
attendance.  
 
Price of labor, price 
of capital-players, 
price of capital-
premises 
Hoefler and 
Payne (2006) 
Stochastic frontier 
model 
NBA association 
clubs 
Ratios of: field goal %, 
free throw %, offensive 
and defensive rebounds, 
assists, steals, turnover, 
blocked shots difference  
Actual number of wins  
Barros and Leach 
(2006b) 
Technical 
efficiency effects 
model 
Soccer clubs in 
the English 
Premier League 
Operational cost Points, attendance, 
turnover.  
Contextual factors: 
population, income, 
European 
Price of labor, price 
of capital-players, 
price of capital-
premises 
Barros and Leach 
(2006a) 
DEA-CCR and BCC 
model 
Soccer clubs in 
the English 
Premier League 
Players, wages, net 
assets and stadium 
facilities 
Points, attendance and 
turnover 
 
Barros and 
Santos (2005) 
DEA-CCR Model 
and DEA-BCC 
model 
Soccer clubs in 
the  Portuguese 
First Division 
Supplies & services 
expenditure, wage 
expenditure, 
amortization 
expenditure, other costs.  
Match, membership, TV 
and sponsorship 
receipts, gains on 
players sold, financial 
receipts, points won, 
tickets sold 
 
Haas (2003A) 
DEA-CCR and DEA-
BCC model 
12 US soccer 
clubs observed 
in year 2000  
Players wages, coaches 
wages, stadium 
utilization rate 
Points awarded, number 
of spectators and total 
revenue 
 
Haas(2003B) 
DEA-CCR and DEA-
BCC model 
20 Premier 
League clubs 
observed in 
year 2000/2001 
Total wages, coach 
salary, home town 
population 
Points, spectators and 
revenue 
 
Barros and 
Santos (2003) 
DEA-Malmquist 
index 
18 training 
activities of 
sports 
federations, 
1999-2001 
Number of Trainers, 
trainers reward, number 
of administrators, 
administrators reward 
and physical capital 
Number of participants, 
number of courses, 
number of approvals  
 
Barros (2003) 
DEA-Allocative 
model 
19 training 
activities of 
sports 
federations, 
1998-2001 
Number of Trainers, 
number of 
administrators, physical 
capital 
Number of participants, 
number of courses, 
number of approvals  
Price of: trainers, 
administrators, and 
capital 
Dawson, Dobson 
and Gerrard 
(2000) 
Stochastic Cobb-
Douglas frontier 
model 
Sample of 
English football 
managers, 
1992-1998 
Player age, career league 
experience, career goals, 
num. of previous teams, 
league appearances in 
previous season, goals 
scored, player divisional 
status 
Winning percentages  
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Hadley,Poitras, 
Ruggiero and 
Knowles (2000) 
Deterministic 
frontier model 
US NFL teams, 
1969/70-
1992/93 
24 independent 
variables describing 
attack and defense. 
Team wins  
Audas, Dobson 
and Goddard 
(1999) 
Hazard functions 
English prof 
soccer, 
1972/73-
1996/97, 
match-level 
data 
Match result, league 
position, manager age, 
manager experience, 
player experience 
Duration (measured by 
the number of league 
matches played) 
 
Hoefler and 
Payne (1997) 
Stochastic 
production 
frontier 
27 NBA teams, 
1992-1993 
Ratios of: field goal %, 
free throw %, turnover, 
offensive rebounds, 
defensive rebounds, 
assists, steals, difference 
in blocked shots  
Actual number of wins  
Fizel and D’Itri 
(1997) 
DEA-CCR model in 
first stage and 
regression 
analysis in second 
stage 
147 College 
basketball 
teams, 1984-
1991 
Player talent, opponent 
strength,  
Winning percentages  
Fizel and D’Itri 
(1996) 
DEA-CCR model 
Baseball 
managers 
Player talent, opponent 
strength,  
Winning percentages  
Scully (1994) 
Deterministic and 
stochastic Cobb-
Douglas frontier 
model 
41 Basketball 
coaches, 
1949/50 to 
1989/90 
Team hitting and team 
pitching 
Win percent  
Porter and Scully 
(1982) 
A linear 
programming 
technique 
(possibly DEA-
CCR) 
Major League 
baseball teams, 
1961-1980 
Team hitting and team 
pitching 
Team percent wins  
DEA is for Data Envelopment Analysis.  
DEA-CCR and DEA-BCC model was respectively proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) and by Banker, Charnes and Cooper 
(1984); model acronym are based on authors’ name. 
This table is for the most part from Barros and Leach (2006a) updated with more recent references.   
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(*** means a 1% significant level result; ** 5%) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 : French football clubs efficiency scores 
CLUBS 
(alphabetical 
order) 
GE PTE SE 
Position 
on/under the 
frontier 
Sportive 
ranking 
Efficiency 
ranking 
    Auxerre 1 1 1 c-c-c 8 1 
    Bordeaux 0.766 0.905 0.846 d-d-d 5 8 
    Lens 0.733 0.956 0.767 d-d-d 6 9 
    Lille 0.875 0.954 0.917 d-d-d 2 6 
    Lyon 0.614 1 0.614 d-d-d 1 13 
    Marseille 0.697 0.884 0.788 d-d-d 2 10 
    Monaco 0.483 0.824 0.586 d-d-i 7 14 
    Nantes 0.662 0.737 0.898 d-d-i 14 11 
    Nice 0.992 0.994 0.997 i-i-i 12 4 
    Paris 0.655 0.850 0.770 d-d-d 9 12 
    Rennes 0.802 0.965 0.831 i-d-i 4 7 
    St-Etienne 1 1 1 c-c-c 11 1 
    Sochaux 1 1 1 c-c-c 9 1 
    Toulouse 0.908 1 0.908 c-i-i 13 5 
Mean 0.79 0.93 0.85 with “c” for “constant”, “i” for “increasing” 
and “d” for “decreasing” returns to scale area 
Table 3 : Mann-Whitney tests of efficiency differences 
Subsamples in comparison 
Z statistics 
 of Mann-Whitney 
Significance level 
Lots of points VS few points 0.432 0.6657 
Big turnovers VS small turnovers 2.069    0.0385** 
Big populations VS small populations 1.993    0.0463** 
Big total wages VS small total wages 3.465     0.0005*** 
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Table 4 : Malmquist Index and their decompositions 
Period For all the French first league 
clubs 
Mean 
 
The entire period  
Malmquist Index 0.7699 
Efficiency evolution 0.9581 
Environment evolution 0.8050 
From 04-05 to 05-06 
Malmquist Index 0.8742 
Efficiency evolution 1.0253 
Environment evolution 0.8522 
From 05-06 to 06-07 
Index de Malmquist 0.9004 
Efficiency evolution 0.9408 
Environment evolution 0.9642 
   
Figure 1 : Three different dynamics for L1 efficiency 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1
 In 2007, the “Bälle, Tore und Finanzen” from Ernst & Yung study ranked the L1 on top of the “big 5” 
in terms of competitive balance. 
2
 For a discussion about football club production functions see Borland (2006). 
3
 In line with Kumbhakar (1997), we selected an output orientation because of the competitive 
environment in which football clubs operate, controlling (partially) their inputs and trying to maximize their 
outputs. 
4
 We traditionally use output market prices to fix bounds. In our case, points being not valued on any 
markets, we arbitrarily fixed bounds to 0.1 and 10, preventing one dimension (sportive or financial) to be more 
than 100 times more important than the other (It is a really soft constraint, our only goal being to guarantee the 
two objectives presence in the maximization problem).  
5
 Talent here is very close to human capital in its broader sense. The total wage also gives information 
on the size of the club roster.   
6
 As testified by administrative switches from Sportive Association to Anonymous Professional 
Sportive Society or by initial public offerings. 
7
 In line with the parsimony rule: j ≥ max [i*o, (i+o)*3] with j the number of observations, i and o 
respectively our inputs and outputs.  
8
 Those impacts span a large range of factors, from an unexpected cost due to exceptional climate 
conditions to a general increase in football demand (as after the FIFA World Cup in 1998).   
9
 We consider this inflation as exogenous because clubs are price takers on the integrated players 
market. 
10
 We may think this domestic over-investment can be explain by European cup participations, but all 
the revenues coming from those international competitions are included in our financial output measure and so 
prevent our scores to be biased. 
